summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorIan Delaney <idella4@gentoo.org>2013-01-30 12:12:31 +0000
committerIan Delaney <idella4@gentoo.org>2013-01-30 12:12:31 +0000
commitbb6558b9d97d094ea78e10d44db34fa18049da8d (patch)
tree8069f0397040235e241c11f7dd76b2dd5bb4d139 /app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0151-XSA-34_35.patch
parentapp-benchmarks/bootchart2: drop old; add USE=X for track-only installations, ... (diff)
downloadgentoo-2-bb6558b9d97d094ea78e10d44db34fa18049da8d.tar.gz
gentoo-2-bb6558b9d97d094ea78e10d44db34fa18049da8d.tar.bz2
gentoo-2-bb6558b9d97d094ea78e10d44db34fa18049da8d.zip
revbumps; -4.2.0-r1, eclass python-single-r1 added to anable & ensure a build by py2 fixing Bug #453930, PYTHON_COMPAT set accordingly, EAPI->5, sed statements reduced to patches, many sec. patches added addressing Bugs #445254, #431156, #454314. -4.2.1-r1, changes mirrored in those of -4.2.0-r1, addition of 3 sec. patches that pertain to 4.2.1. Dropped 4.2.0 & 4.2.1 by virtue of being prone to failure in form of Bug #453930. Sees 4.2.0-r1 ready for testing for stable
(Portage version: 2.1.11.40/cvs/Linux x86_64, signed Manifest commit with key 0xB8072B0D)
Diffstat (limited to 'app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0151-XSA-34_35.patch')
-rw-r--r--app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0151-XSA-34_35.patch70
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0151-XSA-34_35.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0151-XSA-34_35.patch
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f074fa666cbe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-CVE-2013-0151-XSA-34_35.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+commit 66141b2e068fa39f28bdda6be05882e323663687
+Author: Michael Young
+Date: Tue Jan 22 22:22:10 2013 +0000
+
+ Security fix from nested virtualization CVE-2013-0151,
+ restore status option to xend which is used by libvirt
+#diff --git a/xsa34-4.2.patch b/xsa34-4.2.patch
+#new file mode 100644
+#index 0000000..f5328ef
+#--- /dev/null
+#+++ xsa34-4.2.patch
+#@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#+x86_32: don't allow use of nested HVM
+#+
+#+There are (indirect) uses of map_domain_page() in the nested HVM code
+#+that are unsafe when not just using the 1:1 mapping.
+#+
+#+This is XSA-34 / CVE-2013-0151.
+#+
+#+Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich
+#+
+#diff --git a/xsa35-4.2-with-xsa34.patch b/xsa35-4.2-with-xsa34.patch
+#new file mode 100644
+#index 0000000..28c6171
+#--- /dev/null
+#+++ xsa35-4.2-with-xsa34.patch
+#@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#+xen: Do not allow guests to enable nested HVM on themselves
+#+
+#+There is no reason for this and doing so exposes a memory leak to
+#+guests. Only toolstacks need write access to this HVM param.
+#+
+#+This is XSA-35 / CVE-2013-0152.
+#+
+#+Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell
+#+Acked-by: Jan Beulich
+#+
+--- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
++++ xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+@@ -3858,6 +3858,11 @@
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM:
++ if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) )
++ {
++ rc = -EPERM;
++ break;
++ }
+ if ( a.value > 1 )
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+@@ -3926,6 +3926,10 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case HVM_PARAM_NESTEDHVM:
++#ifdef __i386__
++ if ( a.value )
++ rc = -EINVAL;
++#else
+ if ( a.value > 1 )
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) )
+@@ -3940,6 +3944,7 @@ long do_hvm_op(unsigned long op, XEN_GUE
+ for_each_vcpu(d, v)
+ if ( rc == 0 )
+ rc = nestedhvm_vcpu_initialise(v);
++#endif
+ break;
+ case HVM_PARAM_BUFIOREQ_EVTCHN:
+ rc = -EINVAL;