tree clean old ebuilds

(Portage version: 2.2.8/cvs/Linux x86_64, signed Manifest commit with key 0xAABEFD55)

16 files changed, 11 insertions, 1235 deletions

diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog b/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
index fcb23f303771..be2e00169a0e 100644
--- a/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
+++ b/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
 # ChangeLog for app-emulation/xen
 # Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation; Distributed under the GPL v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog,v 1.162 2014/05/17 13:34:02 ago Exp $
+# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/ChangeLog,v 1.163 2014/05/17 14:08:19 dlan Exp $
+
+  17 May 2014; Yixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org> -xen-4.2.3.ebuild,
+  -xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild, -xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild, -xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild,
+  -files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch, -files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch,
+  -files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch,
+  -files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch, -files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch,
+  -files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch, -files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch,
+  -files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch, -files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch,
+  -files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch, -files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch:
+  tree clean old ebuilds
 
   17 May 2014; Agostino Sarubbo <ago@gentoo.org> xen-4.2.4-r2.ebuild:
   Stable for x86, wrt bug #509054
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 209c38b93d59..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4-XSA-83.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-x86/irq: avoid use-after-free on error path in pirq_guest_bind()
-
-This is XSA-83.
-
-Coverity-ID: 1146952
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c
-@@ -1590,8 +1590,7 @@ int pirq_guest_bind(struct vcpu *v, stru
-             printk(XENLOG_G_INFO
-                    "Cannot bind IRQ%d to dom%d. Out of memory.\n",
-                    pirq->pirq, v->domain->domain_id);
--            rc = -ENOMEM;
--            goto out;
-+            return -ENOMEM;
-         }
- 
-         action = newaction;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c9c27c3b6a0..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-x86: restrict XEN_DOMCTL_getmemlist
-
-Coverity ID 1055652
-
-(See the code comment.)
-
-This is CVE-2013-4553 / XSA-74.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
-@@ -329,6 +329,26 @@ long arch_do_domctl(
-             break;
-         }
- 
-+        /*
-+         * XSA-74: This sub-hypercall is broken in several ways:
-+         * - lock order inversion (p2m locks inside page_alloc_lock)
-+         * - no preemption on huge max_pfns input
-+         * - not (re-)checking d->is_dying with page_alloc_lock held
-+         * - not honoring start_pfn input (which libxc also doesn't set)
-+         * Additionally it is rather useless, as the result is stale by the
-+         * time the caller gets to look at it.
-+         * As it only has a single, non-production consumer (xen-mceinj),
-+         * rather than trying to fix it we restrict it for the time being.
-+         */
-+        if ( /* No nested locks inside copy_to_guest_offset(). */
-+             paging_mode_external(current->domain) ||
-+             /* Arbitrary limit capping processing time. */
-+             max_pfns > GB(4) / PAGE_SIZE )
-+        {
-+            ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
-+            break;
-+        }
-+
-         spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
- 
-         ret = i = 0;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5db50cf53f3e..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
-nested VMX: VMLANUCH/VMRESUME emulation must check permission first thing
-
-Otherwise uninitialized data may be used, leading to crashes.
-
-This is XSA-75.
-
-Reported-and-tested-by: Jeff Zimmerman <Jeff_Zimmerman@McAfee.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-and-tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vvmx.c
-@@ -1509,15 +1509,10 @@ static void clear_vvmcs_launched(struct 
-     }
- }
- 
--int nvmx_vmresume(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
-+static int nvmx_vmresume(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
-     struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-     struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
--    int rc;
--
--    rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
--    if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
--        return rc;
- 
-     /* check VMCS is valid and IO BITMAP is set */
-     if ( (nvcpu->nv_vvmcxaddr != VMCX_EADDR) &&
-@@ -1536,6 +1531,10 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user
-     struct vcpu *v = current;
-     struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
-     struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-+    int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
-+
-+    if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-+        return rc;
- 
-     if ( vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcxaddr == VMCX_EADDR )
-     {
-@@ -1555,10 +1554,13 @@ int nvmx_handle_vmresume(struct cpu_user
- int nvmx_handle_vmlaunch(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
- {
-     bool_t launched;
--    int rc;
-     struct vcpu *v = current;
-     struct nestedvcpu *nvcpu = &vcpu_nestedhvm(v);
-     struct nestedvmx *nvmx = &vcpu_2_nvmx(v);
-+    int rc = vmx_inst_check_privilege(regs, 0);
-+
-+    if ( rc != X86EMUL_OKAY )
-+        return rc;
- 
-     if ( vcpu_nestedhvm(v).nv_vvmcxaddr == VMCX_EADDR )
-     {
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c44c353c9fc..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-From: Xen.org security team <security () xen org>
-Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2014 14:18:48 +0000
-
-flask: fix reading strings from guest memory
-
-Since the string size is being specified by the guest, we must range
-check it properly before doing allocations based on it. While for the
-two cases that are exposed only to trusted guests (via policy
-restriction) this just uses an arbitrary upper limit (PAGE_SIZE), for
-the FLASK_[GS]ETBOOL case (which any guest can use) the upper limit
-gets enforced based on the longest name across all boolean settings.
-
-This is XSA-84.
-
-Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
-===================================================================
-From: Xen.org security team <security () xen org>
-Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2014 12:38:51 +0000
-
-From 593bc8c63d582ec0fc2b3a35336106cf9c3a8b34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Date: Sun, 12 Jan 2014 14:29:32 +1300
-Subject: [PATCH] xsm/flask: correct off-by-one in
- flask_security_avc_cachestats cpu id check
-
-This is XSA-85
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
-Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
----
- xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
-index 4426ab9..22878f5 100644
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/flask_op.c
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_sem);
- /* global data for booleans */
- static int bool_num = 0;
- static int *bool_pending_values = NULL;
-+static size_t bool_maxstr;
- static int flask_security_make_bools(void);
- 
- extern int ss_initialized;
-@@ -71,9 +72,15 @@ static int domain_has_security(struct do
-                         perms, NULL);
- }
- 
--static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf, uint32_t size)
-+static int flask_copyin_string(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(char) u_buf, char **buf,
-+                               size_t size, size_t max_size)
- {
--    char *tmp = xmalloc_bytes(size + 1);
-+    char *tmp;
-+
-+    if ( size > max_size )
-+        return -ENOENT;
-+
-+    tmp = xmalloc_array(char, size + 1);
-     if ( !tmp )
-         return -ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -99,7 +106,7 @@ static int flask_security_user(struct xe
-     if ( rv )
-         return rv;
- 
--    rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->u.user, &user, arg->size);
-+    rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->u.user, &user, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE);
-     if ( rv )
-         return rv;
- 
-@@ -210,7 +217,7 @@ static int flask_security_context(struct
-     if ( rv )
-         return rv;
- 
--    rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->context, &buf, arg->size);
-+    rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->context, &buf, arg->size, PAGE_SIZE);
-     if ( rv )
-         return rv;
- 
-@@ -303,7 +310,7 @@ static int flask_security_resolve_bool(s
-     if ( arg->bool_id != -1 )
-         return 0;
- 
--    rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->name, &name, arg->size);
-+    rv = flask_copyin_string(arg->name, &name, arg->size, bool_maxstr);
-     if ( rv )
-         return rv;
- 
-@@ -334,7 +341,7 @@ static int flask_security_set_bool(struc
-         int num;
-         int *values;
- 
--        rv = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values);
-+        rv = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values, NULL);
-         if ( rv != 0 )
-             goto out;
- 
-@@ -440,7 +447,7 @@ static int flask_security_make_bools(voi
-     
-     xfree(bool_pending_values);
-     
--    ret = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values);
-+    ret = security_get_bools(&num, NULL, &values, &bool_maxstr);
-     if ( ret != 0 )
-         goto out;
- 
-@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ static int flask_security_avc_cachestats(struct xen_flask_cache_stats *arg)
- {
-     struct avc_cache_stats *st;
- 
--    if ( arg->cpu > nr_cpu_ids )
-+    if ( arg->cpu >= nr_cpu_ids )
-         return -ENOENT;
-     if ( !cpu_online(arg->cpu) )
-         return -ENOENT;
--- 
-1.8.5.2
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/include/conditional.h
-@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@
- #ifndef _FLASK_CONDITIONAL_H_
- #define _FLASK_CONDITIONAL_H_
- 
--int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
-+#include <xen/types.h>
-+
-+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values, size_t *maxstr);
- 
- int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
- 
---- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
-+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/services.c
-@@ -1850,7 +1850,7 @@ int security_find_bool(const char *name)
-     return rv;
- }
- 
--int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
-+int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values, size_t *maxstr)
- {
-     int i, rc = -ENOMEM;
- 
-@@ -1858,6 +1858,8 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char **
-     if ( names )
-         *names = NULL;
-     *values = NULL;
-+    if ( maxstr )
-+        *maxstr = 0;
- 
-     *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
-     if ( !*len )
-@@ -1879,16 +1881,17 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char **
- 
-     for ( i = 0; i < *len; i++ )
-     {
--        size_t name_len;
-+        size_t name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]);
-+
-         (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
-         if ( names ) {
--            name_len = strlen(policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
--            (*names)[i] = (char*)xmalloc_array(char, name_len);
-+            (*names)[i] = xmalloc_array(char, name_len + 1);
-             if ( !(*names)[i] )
-                 goto err;
--            strlcpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len);
--            (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
-+            strlcpy((*names)[i], policydb.p_bool_val_to_name[i], name_len + 1);
-         }
-+        if ( maxstr && name_len > *maxstr )
-+            *maxstr = name_len;
-     }
-     rc = 0;
- out:
-@@ -2006,7 +2009,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struc
-     struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
-     struct cond_node *cur;
- 
--    rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
-+    rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues, NULL);
-     if ( rc )
-         goto out;
-     for ( i = 0; i < nbools; i++ )
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c31ed5d9f66..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-4.3-XSA-87.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-x86: PHYSDEVOP_{prepare,release}_msix are privileged
-
-Yet this wasn't being enforced.
-
-This is XSA-87.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
---- 2014-01-14.orig/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c	2013-11-18 11:03:37.000000000 +0100
-+++ 2014-01-14/xen/arch/x86/physdev.c	2014-01-22 12:47:47.000000000 +0100
-@@ -640,7 +640,10 @@ ret_t do_physdev_op(int cmd, XEN_GUEST_H
-         if ( copy_from_guest(&dev, arg, 1) )
-             ret = -EFAULT;
-         else
--            ret = pci_prepare_msix(dev.seg, dev.bus, dev.devfn,
-+            ret = xsm_resource_setup_pci(XSM_PRIV,
-+                                         (dev.seg << 16) | (dev.bus << 8) |
-+                                         dev.devfn) ?:
-+                  pci_prepare_msix(dev.seg, dev.bus, dev.devfn,
-                                    cmd != PHYSDEVOP_prepare_msix);
-         break;
-     }
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3fb2338ab76b..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 23260e589e52ec83349f22198eab2331b5a1684e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2013 12:28:47 +1200
-Subject: [PATCH] xen_disk: mark ioreq as mapped before unmapping in error
- case
-
-Commit c6961b7d ("xen_disk: use bdrv_aio_flush instead of bdrv_flush")
-modified the semantics of ioreq_{un,}map so that they are idempotent if
-called when they're not needed (ie., twice in a row). However, it neglected
-to handle the case where batch mapping is not being used (the default), and
-one of the grants fails to map. In this case, ioreq_unmap will be called to
-unwind and unmap any mappings already performed, but ioreq_unmap simply
-returns due to the aforementioned change (the ioreq has not already been
-marked as mapped).
-
-The frontend user can therefore force xen_disk to leak grant mappings, a
-per-backend-domain limited resource.
-
-Fix by marking the ioreq as mapped before calling ioreq_unmap in this
-situation.
-
-This is XSA-71 / CVE-2013-4375
-
-Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
----
- hw/xen_disk.c |    1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff -ur xen-4.3.0.orig/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c xen-4.3.0/tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c
---- tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c	2013-06-18 00:39:51.000000000 +0800
-+++ tools/qemu-xen-traditional/hw/xen_disk.c	2013-11-06 11:05:44.977888267 +0800
-@@ -298,6 +298,7 @@
- 		xen_be_printf(&ioreq->blkdev->xendev, 0,
- 			      "can't map grant ref %d (%s, %d maps)\n",
- 			      ioreq->refs[i], strerror(errno), ioreq->blkdev->cnt_map);
-+		ioreq->mapped = 1;
- 		ioreq_unmap(ioreq);
- 		return -1;
- 	    }
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e644afe3b0da..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-From 068bfa76bbd52430e65853375e1d5db99d193e2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 20:49:00 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] gnttab: correct locking order reversal
-
-Coverity ID 1087189
-
-Correct a lock order reversal between a domains page allocation and grant
-table locks.
-
-This is CVE-2013-4494 / XSA-73.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
-
-Consolidate error handling.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Reviewed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
-Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
----
- xen/common/grant_table.c |   52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-index f42bc7a..48df928 100644
---- a/xen/common/grant_table.c
-+++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c
-@@ -1517,6 +1517,8 @@ gnttab_transfer(
- 
-     for ( i = 0; i < count; i++ )
-     {
-+        bool_t okay;
-+
-         if (i && hypercall_preempt_check())
-             return i;
- 
-@@ -1625,16 +1627,18 @@ gnttab_transfer(
-          * pages when it is dying.
-          */
-         if ( unlikely(e->is_dying) ||
--             unlikely(e->tot_pages >= e->max_pages) ||
--             unlikely(!gnttab_prepare_for_transfer(e, d, gop.ref)) )
-+             unlikely(e->tot_pages >= e->max_pages) )
-         {
--            if ( !e->is_dying )
--                gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
--                        "Transferee has no reservation "
--                        "headroom (%d,%d) or provided a bad grant ref (%08x) "
--                        "or is dying (%d)\n",
--                        e->tot_pages, e->max_pages, gop.ref, e->is_dying);
-             spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+
-+            if ( e->is_dying )
-+                gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-+                         "Transferee (d%d) is dying\n", e->domain_id);
-+            else
-+                gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-+                         "Transferee (d%d) has no headroom (tot %u, max %u)\n",
-+                         e->domain_id, e->tot_pages, e->max_pages);
-+
-             rcu_unlock_domain(e);
-             put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
-             page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
-@@ -1646,6 +1650,38 @@ gnttab_transfer(
-         /* Okay, add the page to 'e'. */
-         if ( unlikely(domain_adjust_tot_pages(e, 1) == 1) )
-             get_knownalive_domain(e);
-+
-+        /*
-+         * We must drop the lock to avoid a possible deadlock in
-+         * gnttab_prepare_for_transfer.  We have reserved a page in e so can
-+         * safely drop the lock and re-aquire it later to add page to the
-+         * pagelist.
-+         */
-+        spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+        okay = gnttab_prepare_for_transfer(e, d, gop.ref);
-+        spin_lock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+
-+        if ( unlikely(!okay) || unlikely(e->is_dying) )
-+        {
-+            bool_t drop_dom_ref = (domain_adjust_tot_pages(e, -1) == 0);
-+
-+            spin_unlock(&e->page_alloc_lock);
-+
-+            if ( okay /* i.e. e->is_dying due to the surrounding if() */ )
-+                gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "gnttab_transfer: "
-+                         "Transferee (d%d) is now dying\n", e->domain_id);
-+
-+            if ( drop_dom_ref )
-+                put_domain(e);
-+            rcu_unlock_domain(e);
-+
-+            put_gfn(d, gop.mfn);
-+            page->count_info &= ~(PGC_count_mask|PGC_allocated);
-+            free_domheap_page(page);
-+            gop.status = GNTST_general_error;
-+            goto copyback;
-+        }
-+
-         page_list_add_tail(page, &e->page_list);
-         page_set_owner(page, e);
- 
--- 
-1.7.10.4
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 54e4325a0de8..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-x86/HVM: only allow ring 0 guest code to make hypercalls
-
-Anything else would allow for privilege escalation.
-
-This is CVE-2013-4554 / XSA-76.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
-@@ -3359,7 +3359,7 @@ int hvm_do_hypercall(struct cpu_user_reg
-     case 4:
-     case 2:
-         hvm_get_segment_register(curr, x86_seg_ss, &sreg);
--        if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl == 3) )
-+        if ( unlikely(sreg.attr.fields.dpl) )
-         {
-     default:
-             regs->eax = -EPERM;
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a8c1330ac3d..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q4/att-322/xsa78.patch
-VT-d: fix TLB flushing in dma_pte_clear_one()
-
-The third parameter of __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush() is to indicate
-whether the to be flushed entry was a present one. A few lines before,
-we bailed if !dma_pte_present(*pte), so there's no need to check the
-flag here again - we can simply always pass TRUE here.
-
-This is XSA-78.
-
-Suggested-by: Cheng Yueqiang <yqcheng.2008@phdis.smu.edu.sg>
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
-@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void dma_pte_clear_one(struct dom
-     iommu_flush_cache_entry(pte, sizeof(struct dma_pte));
- 
-     if ( !this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) )
--        __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush(domain, addr >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K , 0, 1);
-+        __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush(domain, addr >> PAGE_SHIFT_4K, 1, 1);
- 
-     unmap_vtd_domain_page(page);
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c9045959a018..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-IOMMU: clear "don't flush" override on error paths
-
-Both xenmem_add_to_physmap() and iommu_populate_page_table() each have
-an error path that fails to clear that flag, thus suppressing further
-flushes on the respective pCPU.
-
-In iommu_populate_page_table() also slightly re-arrange code to avoid
-the false impression of the flag in question being guarded by a
-domain's page_alloc_lock.
-
-This is CVE-2013-6400 / XSA-80.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
-@@ -4648,7 +4648,7 @@ static int xenmem_add_to_physmap(struct 
-         {
-             rc = xenmem_add_to_physmap_once(d, xatp);
-             if ( rc < 0 )
--                return rc;
-+                break;
- 
-             xatp->idx++;
-             xatp->gpfn++;
---- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/iommu.c
-@@ -306,11 +306,11 @@ static int iommu_populate_page_table(str
- {
-     struct hvm_iommu *hd = domain_hvm_iommu(d);
-     struct page_info *page;
--    int rc;
-+    int rc = 0;
- 
-+    this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 1;
-     spin_lock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
- 
--    this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 1;
-     page_list_for_each ( page, &d->page_list )
-     {
-         if ( is_hvm_domain(d) ||
-@@ -320,18 +320,20 @@ static int iommu_populate_page_table(str
-             rc = hd->platform_ops->map_page(
-                 d, mfn_to_gmfn(d, page_to_mfn(page)), page_to_mfn(page),
-                 IOMMUF_readable|IOMMUF_writable);
--            if (rc)
--            {
--                spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
--                hd->platform_ops->teardown(d);
--                return rc;
--            }
-+            if ( rc )
-+                break;
-         }
-     }
--    this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 0;
--    iommu_iotlb_flush_all(d);
-+
-     spin_unlock(&d->page_alloc_lock);
--    return 0;
-+    this_cpu(iommu_dont_flush_iotlb) = 0;
-+
-+    if ( !rc )
-+        iommu_iotlb_flush_all(d);
-+    else
-+        hd->platform_ops->teardown(d);
-+
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- 
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch b/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 22648562283e..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/files/xen-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2013/q4/att-385/xsa82.patch
-x86/AMD: work around erratum 793
-
-The recommendation is to set a bit in an MSR - do this if the firmware
-didn't, considering that otherwise we expose ourselves to a guest
-induced DoS.
-
-This is CVE-2013-6885 / XSA-82.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
-Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
-
---- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
-@@ -476,6 +476,20 @@ static void __devinit init_amd(struct cp
- 		       "*** Pass \"allow_unsafe\" if you're trusting"
- 		       " all your (PV) guest kernels. ***\n");
- 
-+	if (c->x86 == 0x16 && c->x86_model <= 0xf) {
-+		rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value);
-+		if (!(value & (1 << 15))) {
-+			static bool_t warned;
-+
-+			if (c == &boot_cpu_data || opt_cpu_info ||
-+			    !test_and_set_bool(warned))
-+				printk(KERN_WARNING
-+				       "CPU%u: Applying workaround for erratum 793\n",
-+				       smp_processor_id());
-+			wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, value | (1 << 15));
-+		}
-+	}
-+
- 	/* AMD CPUs do not support SYSENTER outside of legacy mode. */
- 	clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_SEP, c->x86_capability);
- 
---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h
-@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
- 
- /* AMD64 MSRs */
- #define MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG		0xc001001f
-+#define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG		0xc0011020
- #define MSR_AMD64_IC_CFG		0xc0011021
- #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG		0xc0011022
- #define AMD64_NB_CFG_CF8_EXT_ENABLE_BIT	46
-
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 04131dea8af4..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.3.ebuild,v 1.4 2014/02/21 04:53:41 idella4 Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
-	KEYWORDS=""
-	REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
-	EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
-	S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
-	live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
-	KEYWORDS="amd64 x86"
-	UPSTREAM_VER=0
-	GENTOO_VER=
-
-	[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
-		UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
-	[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
-		GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
-	SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
-		${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
-		${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask pae xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
-	efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
-	!efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="
-	flask? ( xsm )
-	"
-
-pkg_setup() {
-	python-any-r1_pkg_setup
-	if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
-		if use x86 && use amd64; then
-			die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
-		elif use x86; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
-		elif use amd64; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
-		else
-			die "Unsupported architecture!"
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	if use flask ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-		export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
-	elif use xsm ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-	fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
-	# Upstream's patchset
-	if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
-		EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
-		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
-			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
-	fi
-
-	# Gentoo's patchset
-	if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
-		EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
-		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
-			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
-	fi
-
-	# Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
-	epatch  "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
-	if use efi; then
-		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
-		export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
-		export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
-	fi
-
-	# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
-		# try and remove all the default custom-cflags
-		find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
-	fi
-
-	# not strictly necessary to fix this
-	sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
-	epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-	use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
-		replace-flags -O3 -O2
-	else
-		unset CFLAGS
-	fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
-	# Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
-	emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
-	local myopt
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-	use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
-	# The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
-	if use efi; then
-		mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
-	fi
-
-	emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
-	elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
-	elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
-	elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
-	use pae && ewarn "This is a PAE build of Xen. It will *only* boot PAE kernels!"
-	use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 21405b77e54f..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.2.4-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/04/09 21:35:41 dlan Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python{2_6,2_7} )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
-	KEYWORDS=""
-	REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
-	EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
-	S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
-	live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
-	KEYWORDS="~amd64 ~x86"
-	UPSTREAM_VER=0
-	GENTOO_VER=
-
-	[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
-		UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
-	[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
-		GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
-	SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
-		${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
-		${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask pae xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
-	efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
-	!efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="
-	flask? ( xsm )
-	"
-
-pkg_setup() {
-	python-any-r1_pkg_setup
-	if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
-		if use x86 && use amd64; then
-			die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
-		elif use x86; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
-		elif use amd64; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
-		else
-			die "Unsupported architecture!"
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	if use flask ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-		export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
-	elif use xsm ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-	fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
-	# Upstream's patchset
-	if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
-		EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
-		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
-			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
-	fi
-
-	# Gentoo's patchset
-	if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
-		EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
-		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
-			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
-	fi
-
-	# Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
-	epatch  "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
-	if use efi; then
-		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
-		export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
-		export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
-	fi
-
-	# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
-		# try and remove all the default custom-cflags
-		find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
-	fi
-
-	# not strictly necessary to fix this
-	sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
-	epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-	use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
-		replace-flags -O3 -O2
-	else
-		unset CFLAGS
-	fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
-	# Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
-	emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
-	local myopt
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-	use pae && myopt="${myopt} pae=y"
-
-	# The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
-	if use efi; then
-		mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
-	fi
-
-	emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
-	elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
-	elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
-	elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
-	use pae && ewarn "This is a PAE build of Xen. It will *only* boot PAE kernels!"
-	use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 44fdd94c1dca..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.1-r5.ebuild,v 1.2 2014/02/16 06:40:24 ago Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python2_7 )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
-	KEYWORDS=""
-	REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
-	EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
-	S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
-	live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
-	# Set to match entry in stable 4.3.1-r1, Bug 493944
-	KEYWORDS="amd64 -x86"
-	SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
-	efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
-	!efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="flask? ( xsm )"
-
-# Security patches
-XSA_PATCHES=(
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-4375-XSA-71.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-4494-XSA-73.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-75.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-6375-XSA-78.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-6885-XSA-82.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-CVE-2013-4553-XSA-74.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-4554-XSA-76.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-CVE-2013-6400-XSA-80.patch
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4-XSA-83.patch				# bug #499054
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-CVE-2014-263-XSA-84-85.patch		# bug #500528 500536
-	"${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.3-XSA-87.patch				# bug #499124
-)
-
-pkg_setup() {
-	python-any-r1_pkg_setup
-	if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
-		if use x86 && use amd64; then
-			die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
-		elif use x86; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
-		elif use amd64; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
-		else
-			die "Unsupported architecture!"
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	if use flask ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-		export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
-	elif use xsm ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-	fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
-	# Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
-	epatch  "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
-	if use efi; then
-		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
-		export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
-		export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
-	fi
-
-	# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
-		# try and remove all the default custom-cflags
-		find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
-	fi
-
-	# not strictly necessary to fix this
-	sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
-	[[ ${XSA_PATCHES[@]} ]] && epatch "${XSA_PATCHES[@]}"
-
-	epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
-		replace-flags -O3 -O2
-	else
-		unset CFLAGS
-	fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
-	# Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
-	emake CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
-	local myopt
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
-	# The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
-	if use efi; then
-		mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
-	fi
-
-	emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
-	elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
-	elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
-	elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
-	use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}
diff --git a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild b/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild
deleted file mode 100644
index 376e03b06acd..000000000000
--- a/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
-# Copyright 1999-2014 Gentoo Foundation
-# Distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License v2
-# $Header: /var/cvsroot/gentoo-x86/app-emulation/xen/xen-4.3.2-r1.ebuild,v 1.1 2014/04/09 21:35:41 dlan Exp $
-
-EAPI=5
-
-PYTHON_COMPAT=( python2_7 )
-
-if [[ $PV == *9999 ]]; then
-	KEYWORDS=""
-	REPO="xen-unstable.hg"
-	EHG_REPO_URI="http://xenbits.xensource.com/${REPO}"
-	S="${WORKDIR}/${REPO}"
-	live_eclass="mercurial"
-else
-	# Set to match entry in stable 4.3.1-r1, Bug 493944
-	KEYWORDS="~amd64 -x86"
-	UPSTREAM_VER=0
-	GENTOO_VER=
-
-	[[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]] && \
-		UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-upstream-patches-${UPSTREAM_VER}.tar.xz"
-	[[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]] && \
-		GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI="http://dev.gentoo.org/~dlan/distfiles/${P}-gentoo-patches-${GENTOO_VER}.tar.xz"
-	SRC_URI="http://bits.xensource.com/oss-xen/release/${PV}/xen-${PV}.tar.gz
-		${UPSTREAM_PATCHSET_URI}
-		${GENTOO_PATCHSET_URI}"
-fi
-
-inherit mount-boot flag-o-matic python-any-r1 toolchain-funcs eutils ${live_eclass}
-
-DESCRIPTION="The Xen virtual machine monitor"
-HOMEPAGE="http://xen.org/"
-LICENSE="GPL-2"
-SLOT="0"
-IUSE="custom-cflags debug efi flask xsm"
-
-DEPEND="${PYTHON_DEPS}
-	efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[multitarget] )
-	!efi? ( >=sys-devel/binutils-2.22[-multitarget] )"
-RDEPEND=""
-PDEPEND="~app-emulation/xen-tools-${PV}"
-
-RESTRICT="test"
-
-# Approved by QA team in bug #144032
-QA_WX_LOAD="boot/xen-syms-${PV}"
-
-REQUIRED_USE="flask? ( xsm )"
-
-pkg_setup() {
-	python-any-r1_pkg_setup
-	if [[ -z ${XEN_TARGET_ARCH} ]]; then
-		if use x86 && use amd64; then
-			die "Confusion! Both x86 and amd64 are set in your use flags!"
-		elif use x86; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_32"
-		elif use amd64; then
-			export XEN_TARGET_ARCH="x86_64"
-		else
-			die "Unsupported architecture!"
-		fi
-	fi
-
-	if use flask ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-		export "FLASK_ENABLE=y"
-	elif use xsm ; then
-		export "XSM_ENABLE=y"
-	fi
-}
-
-src_prepare() {
-	# Upstream's patchset
-	if [[ -n ${UPSTREAM_VER} ]]; then
-		EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
-		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
-			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-upstream
-	fi
-
-	# Gentoo's patchset
-	if [[ -n ${GENTOO_VER} ]]; then
-		EPATCH_SUFFIX="patch" \
-		EPATCH_FORCE="yes" \
-			epatch "${WORKDIR}"/patches-gentoo
-	fi
-
-	# Drop .config and fix gcc-4.6
-	epatch  "${FILESDIR}"/${PN/-pvgrub/}-4.3-fix_dotconfig-gcc.patch
-
-	if use efi; then
-		epatch "${FILESDIR}"/${PN}-4.2-efi.patch
-		export EFI_VENDOR="gentoo"
-		export EFI_MOUNTPOINT="boot"
-	fi
-
-	# if the user *really* wants to use their own custom-cflags, let them
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		einfo "User wants their own CFLAGS - removing defaults"
-		# try and remove all the default custom-cflags
-		find "${S}" -name Makefile -o -name Rules.mk -o -name Config.mk -exec sed \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O3\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-march=i686\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-fomit-frame-pointer\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-g3*\s\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2 \3/' \
-			-e 's/CFLAGS\(.*\)=\(.*\)-O2\(.*\)/CFLAGS\1=\2\3/' \
-			-i {} \; || die "failed to re-set custom-cflags"
-	fi
-
-	# not strictly necessary to fix this
-	sed -i 's/, "-Werror"//' "${S}/tools/python/setup.py" || die "failed to re-set setup.py"
-
-	epatch_user
-}
-
-src_configure() {
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
-	if use custom-cflags; then
-		filter-flags -fPIE -fstack-protector
-		replace-flags -O3 -O2
-	else
-		unset CFLAGS
-	fi
-}
-
-src_compile() {
-	# Send raw LDFLAGS so that --as-needed works
-	emake V=1 CC="$(tc-getCC)" LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" LD="$(tc-getLD)" -C xen ${myopt}
-}
-
-src_install() {
-	local myopt
-	use debug && myopt="${myopt} debug=y"
-
-	# The 'make install' doesn't 'mkdir -p' the subdirs
-	if use efi; then
-		mkdir -p "${D}"${EFI_MOUNTPOINT}/efi/${EFI_VENDOR} || die
-	fi
-
-	emake LDFLAGS="$(raw-ldflags)" DESTDIR="${D}" -C xen ${myopt} install
-}
-
-pkg_postinst() {
-	elog "Official Xen Guide and the unoffical wiki page:"
-	elog " http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/xen-guide.xml"
-	elog " http://en.gentoo-wiki.com/wiki/Xen/"
-
-	use efi && einfo "The efi executable is installed in boot/efi/gentoo"
-}