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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE glsa SYSTEM "http://www.gentoo.org/dtd/glsa.dtd">
<glsa id="200603-08">
  <title>GnuPG: Incorrect signature verification</title>
  <synopsis>
    GnuPG may erroneously report a modified or unsigned message has a valid
    digital signature.
  </synopsis>
  <product type="ebuild">gnupg</product>
  <announced>2006-03-10</announced>
  <revised>2006-03-10: 01</revised>
  <bug>125217</bug>
  <access>remote</access>
  <affected>
    <package name="app-crypt/gnupg" auto="yes" arch="*">
      <unaffected range="ge">1.4.2.2</unaffected>
      <vulnerable range="lt">1.4.2.2</vulnerable>
    </package>
  </affected>
  <background>
    <p>
    The GNU Privacy Guard, GnuPG, is a free replacement for the PGP
    suite of cryptographic software that may be used without restriction,
    as it does not rely on any patented algorithms. GnuPG can be used to
    digitally sign messages, a method of ensuring the authenticity of a
    message using public key cryptography.
    </p>
  </background>
  <description>
    <p>
    OpenPGP is the standard that defines the format of digital
    signatures supported by GnuPG. OpenPGP signatures consist of multiple
    sections, in a strictly defined order. Tavis Ormandy of the Gentoo
    Linux Security Audit Team discovered that certain illegal signature
    formats could allow signed data to be modified without detection. GnuPG
    has previously attempted to be lenient when processing malformed or
    legacy signature formats, but this has now been found to be insecure.
    </p>
  </description>
  <impact type="normal">
    <p>
    A remote attacker may be able to construct or modify a
    digitally-signed message, potentially allowing them to bypass
    authentication systems, or impersonate another user.
    </p>
  </impact>
  <workaround>
    <p>
    There is no known workaround at this time.
    </p>
  </workaround>
  <resolution>
    <p>
    All GnuPG users should upgrade to the latest version:
    </p>
    <code>
    # emerge --sync
    # emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose "&gt;=app-crypt/gnupg-1.4.2.2"</code>
  </resolution>
  <references>
    <uri link="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-0049">CVE-2006-0049</uri>
    <uri link="http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2006q1/000216.html">GnuPG Announcement</uri>
  </references>
  <metadata tag="submitter" timestamp="2006-03-08T22:34:09Z">
    taviso
  </metadata>
  <metadata tag="bugReady" timestamp="2006-03-10T21:32:19Z">
    koon
  </metadata>
</glsa>